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Abstract—Deep neural networks have had enormous impact
on various domains of computer science, considerably outper-
forming previous state of the art machine learning techniques.
To achieve this performance, neural networks need large quan-
tities of data and huge computational resources, which heavily
increases their construction costs. The increased cost of building
a good deep neural network model gives rise to a need for pro-
tecting this investment from potential copyright infringements.
Legitimate owners of a machine learning model want to be able
to reliably track and detect a malicious adversary that tries to
steal the intellectual property related to the model. Recently, this
problem was tackled by introducing in deep neural networks
the concept of watermarking, which allows a legitimate owner
to embed some secret information(watermark) in a given model.
The watermark allows the legitimate owner to detect copyright
infringements of his model. This paper focuses on verifying the
robustness and reliability of state-of- the-art deep neural network
watermarking schemes. We show that, a malicious adversary,
even in scenarios where the watermark is difficult to remove,
can still evade the verification by the legitimate owners, thus
avoiding the detection of model theft.
Index Terms—Security and Privacy, Watermarking, Deep Neu-
ral Networks, Backdoors, Ensembles, Machine Learning as a
Service.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, deep learning is changing all sectors of the
industry at a fast rate. Neural networks, the secret ingredient
standing at the core of this domain, are being adopted not
only by major technology giants but also by startups. Deep
learning has had significant impact on various domains of
computer science such as image recognition [1]–[5], speech
recognition [6]–[9], natural language processing [10]–[12],
gaming [13], [14], and more, significantly outperforming state-
of-the-art machine learning(ML) algorithms previously used in
such domains. To achieve such performance, neural networks
require large quantities of training data. The more the merrier,
as this would allow the model to improve while extracting
and learning a myriad of new features, resulting in better per-
formance. Simultaneously, the increasing demand for massive
amounts of data and deeper networks has had a direct impact
on the costs of producing a high quality model. Typically, the
workflow of the construction of a high quality model can be
briefly summarized as follows: (a) Dataset Assembly: Building
high quality datasets requires human assistance to carefully
select the elements that will be part of the training set, and also
assign them the appropriate label. (b) Model Training: Gener-
ally, training phase requires a lot of computation time in high
end GPUs. This process involves also the time spent on trying
to find the most suitable network architecture and parameters.
In many cases, finding the most suitable architecture can be
difficult, hence resulting in a lot of time spent on training
models that do not perform good. As it can be deducted,
all this procedure results in considerable monetary costs. For
instance, professional GPUs start at couple of thousands of
Euros per piece and building a commercially viable ML model
requires a large number of GPUs. Monetizing the prediction
capability of machine learning models has lead to the creation
of machine learning as a service platforms (MLaaS) [15].
In these platforms, major technology giants provide APIs to
interact with their trained proprietary deep learning models
which generally reside in cloud services. APIs allow users
to query the models paying various costs for different query
budgets. While this might be beneficial to developers, at the
same time it is a fertile ground for malicious adversaries.
Smart attackers can use such queries to steal machine learning
models as shown in the recent work by Trame`r et al [16].
Once the model is extracted, the attackers can have direct
access to parameters of the model, allowing them to: (1)
potentially learn sensitive information concerning proprietary
training data; (2) unlimited queries to the model, avoiding to
pay usage fees; (3) monetize the prediction capability of the
stolen model by providing a prediction API, usually cheaper
than the legitimate owners service.
Other companies might follow a different business model
where they prefer selling their machine learning (ML) model.
In doing so, the companies are concerned that their customers
might resell the ML model to third parties. Moreover, the
presence of malicious insiders in a company may leak the
proprietary ML model to other parties.
These scenarios lead to a similar output: They threaten
the business model of the legitimate owner. The presence
of above-mentioned attacks and the increase in the costs of
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building a high-quality ML model, pushes legitimate owners
to call for ways to detect if their proprietary model is stolen
or redistributed without permission. Recently this problem
was tackled by introducing the concept of watermarks [17]
in machine learning models, so that in case of a model leak, a
suspected ML model could be tested to verify if it was stolen
or not. Traditionally, a watermark is a mark that is hidden in
a file for the purpose of verifying authenticity of the data or
tracking copyright violations. In this case, the legitimate owner
of a ML model tries to perform something similar to this, by
embedding a secret information into the ML model that will
aid him in the future to detect possible copyright violations.
This paper shows that the current state-of-the-art deep
neural network(DNN) watermarking techniques are not safe.
In particular, we present the design and implementation of
two novel evasion attacks that allow a malicious adversary to
run a service with stolen proprietary ML models, and still go
undetected by the legitimate owners of those models.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we give some relevant background knowledge
and afterwards we treat in details the watermarking technique
that we attack.
A. Backdoors in Neural Networks
Backdoors [18] are traditionally known as trap doors. They
are implemented with the sole purpose of evading a security
mechanism in order to get access on restricted resources of a
computer or the computer itself. Normally software developers
include backdoors for specific purposes in their applications.
Nevertheless, these backdoors are dangerous if discovered by
malicious entities. Malicious entities try to find and exploit
backdoors in order to install malware in the system, to gain
more access, steal private information and more. Recently,
with the blooming of deep neural networks, the concept of
backdoors is also present into them, even though slightly
different from the traditional definition.
A backdoor in a neural network is defined as an instance or
a set of instances, that when are presented to the backdoored-
classifier, it will classify them in a pre-set target label as
instructed while training. In brief a backdoor may seem like
an adversarial example, but it is different form it, because the
classifier is intentionally trained to output the specific class
when presented with the backdoor-trigger. The ability to add
backdoors to deep neural networks comes as an result of the
over-parametrization characteristic of a neural network. Due
to that characteristic, an entity can implement a backdoor
in the classifier without affecting the overall accuracy that
the network should have in the original task. Implementing a
backdoor in a neural network is done through what is known as
training-set poisoning [19]. The entity that wants to implement
the backdoor, has only to create a small set that will serve as
backdoor-triggers and decide the class that the neural network
should give to them and then append these instances to the
train set. When the model is trained it will learn, beside
classifying clean instances, to correctly classify the instances
that are part of the backdoor.
Gu et al [20] show the problems that backdoors might cause
in real life. As an example of the risks that backdoored neural
networks present, imagine an image classifier that is going to
be used in a self-driving vehicle. The malicious entity might
put as the backdoor trigger a sticky note, that is over a speed
limit sign and assigning that image a target class of 90 miles
per hour speed limit. This means that the self-driving car
would go straight in an intersection by causing real problems
like crashes due to reckless driving and even human fatalities.
Beside the negative and dark shadow that lies in the concept
of backdoors, they can also be used for good purposes as
in [21], in which a method to protect the ownership of ML
models is presented by using backdoors to watermark a deep
neural network.
B. Watermarking Neural Networks via Backdooring
The work done by Adi et al [21], presents one approach for
embedding a watermark in a neural network. In contrary to
the work presented by Merrer et al [22], here the watermark
construction is based on the concept of backdooring neural
networks [20]. They rely on the ability of a deep neural
network to be over-parametrized which also leads to the ability
to insert backdoors in them. These backdoors are not seen as
a good property in neural networks due to the risks they can
introduce if a network is maliciously backdoored as shown by
Gu et al [20]. But the authors of [21] turn this bad thing into
a good one, by introducing a watermarking technique that is
very hard to find and remove, and works very good in both
black-box and white-box scenarios.
They create a set of instances, here named trigger-set, that
is unique enough, and assign to each of those items a random
class among the classes that the original model should classify.
The instances are selected to be distant enough from each
other to guarantee that, if a portion of the trigger-set leaks, the
adversary can not infer anything about the rest of the instances
of the trigger-set. Considering an image classification task,
the trigger set elements are selected from a set of random
abstract images and the selection process makes sure that
the current image that is selected is not part of the set and
the images selected are as different as possible from each
other. Watermarking the deep neural network now requires
only training the network, beside the original training set, also
on the watermark instances.
The verification of the presence of the watermark in the
model is done by querying the model with the instances of
the watermark set. The procedure takes as an extra parameter
the value , which is a tolerance parameter used to define the
threshold in which the outputs of the queries are considered
enough to have a claim of the ownership of that specific model.
The reason why this is necessary is that when a model is
stolen it can undergo some procedures that might alter its
behavior, such as fine-tunning, parameter-clipping etc. If the
target model answers correctly to at least |trigger − set|
elements of the watermark trigger set then a claim can be
done on its ownership. Using this verification algorithm makes
it possible to verify the ownership by an honest party such
as the legitimate owner of the model and a legal party such
as a judge. In this conditions when an honest party exists
like the judge then this scheme is very good, but if public-
verifiability is to be achieved than this scheme is not for it.
The reason behind it is that after the verification algorithm is
run, the adversary will get his hands on the watermark trigger
set and can fine tune the model to get rid of the watermark.
If an entity wants to make possible the public-verification of
the model it can do it for a limited amount of verifications.
The verification procedure will have to be divided into steps
and in each iteration a new key is released. This means that
to make this possible you have to embed many watermarks
in the model. This approach has its limitation due to the
maximum amount of backdoors that can be embedded in a
neural network.
Beside the problem of public verification this method is very
robust to the most crucial problems which are: Removability
and Overwriting of the watermark. In the case of removability
the authors have evaluated by fine-tunning the model to get
rid of the watermark or make it not verifiable. The models
are pretty robust to this kind of attack since they rely in
backdoors for their construction, and backdoors are hard to
find inside a deep neural network. In case of a fine-tunning
attack that wants to embed a new watermark in the model,
the legitimate owner will still have its original watermark in
the model so the verification can still be done. An adversary
can not claim ownership on the model even by having partial
or full knowledge of watermark embedding procedure. This is
achieved by randomly gathering abstract images from various
sources and making sure they are very different form each
other and also the class that is assigned to them is completely
random.
In this research we ask ourselves this question:
Assuming that the watermark might not be removed, can we
evade its verification in a black-box scenario? And the answer
to that question is Yes. In the following sections two evasion
attacks are presented that are able to evade backdoor-based
watermarks in black-box scenarios.
III. ENSEMBLE ATTACK
To evade the watermark verification we can use ML models
stolen from various providers, that are almost equally good in
prediction quality and that are trained to perform the same
task. With those models we build a voting-mechanism that,
given a query, the returned prediction will be the class which
got more votes.
A. Attack Overview
The adversary steals n-models and with them he builds a
service in the form of a MLaaS. The machine learning model
residing behind the adversarys service will be an ensemble of
stolen ML models from various sources. When a prediction
query will be presented to the service API, the gateway layer,
API Layer
Model 1 Model 2 Model N
Query Instance
Fig. 1. The Ensemble set-up.
in which the logic is embedded, will query each of the n-
models and get their answer. The returned answer to the query
will be the class which got more votes. In cases when there
is no mode, a random class out of that set will be returned.
In this way, the legitimate owner of one of the models that
are residing in the adversarys service, can not verify whether
the model is his, because probabilistically he will be able
to confirm a small subset of the watermark. And this subset
varies in terms of the number of participating models in the
ensemble. The higher the number the lower the portion of the
verified watermark.
Beside the ensemble, the core of this attack is the ability of a
neural network model to give a prediction to an input instance
even if it has no knowledge of the instance. Considering this
feature, the predicted class for a input instance that a model has
never seen(like the watermark triggers), can be considered as
a random event. That random event can be thought as rolling a
n-sided die, where each of the sides is one of the n-classes that
the model predicts. The model will return as a prediction to
the unseen instance the class that resulted after rolling the die.
This analogy makes it easy to understand the concept behind
the prediction of unseen instances that are far different from
the instances that the model is trained on.
Considering a deep convolutional neural network trained to
recognize handwritten-digits of MNIST [23] dataset, the model
will know nothing about a weird abstract image that has no
specific number in it, but by construction, a correctly formatted
input will always get a prediction after passing through the
network. This evasion method does not affect the quality of
service for the regular instances of the task it is designed to
solve, because all the stolen models are high quality ones.
Moreover, research has shown that ensembles of good models
can be better predictors [24].
B. Ensemble set-up
To construct the ensemble the adversary steals some ma-
chine learning models, by using attacks like the one presented
by Trame`r et al [16] in the case when it is attacking a model
residing in a MLaaS, or buy it for way cheaper price in the
DarkWeb.
The stolen models will be put behind a programmatic API
layer(see Figure 1). Here we are considering that the ensemble
will reside behind an API layer so the users(including the
legitimate owners of each model) will have only black-box
access, meaning they can just pose a query to the model(in this
case to the API interface). The query posed to the adversarys
service will be intercepted by the API layer, then the API will
query each model of the ensemble with that query instance,
and record their responses. After all the participants in the
ensemble have been queried, the API layer will compute the
Mode of the returned results, and return it to the user that made
the query. In cases when there is no majority on a certain class,
i.e all the models predicted the instance in a different class,
the API will roll a die among those answers and return one
of them.
C. Ensemble experiments
The experiments are initially done in a bigger ensemble
composed of seven models. Afterwards the ensemble size
is reduced one by one until three models are left in the
ensemble and again the watermarking verification procedure
is attempted for each of the participating ML models. To
make the experiment more realistic we assume that all the
models are watermarked. The watermark trigger-sets of the
models participating in the ensemble do not intersect because
of the watermark embedding procedure shown in [21], and
also because we are considering that the models are stolen
from different providers which have no way to know the
secret watermark that other companies embed in their model.
Since the models will be stolen from different providers
the watermarks they have put in their respective models are
completely different from each other.
In our experiments we consider an image classification
task. We build 7 convolutional neural networks and train
them to solve MNIST [23] digit recognition task. For each
of the models we generate a watermark composed of 10
instances. We randomly select 10 abstract images and assign
them completely random labels as suggested by Adi et al [21].
We use the from-scratch watermark embedding method, which
involves putting the watermark instances in the training set and
train the model. Similar performance can be achieved even by
fine-tunning the model on the watermark set, but training from
the beginning is a more reliable method as the authors of [21]
have also shown. We keep the model architecture similar
among all seven models. In this way we can focus on the
watermark, and not on the effect that other model parameters
might have on the watermark embedding in the model. All the
models achieve an accuracy on the original MNIST test-set of
above 99% so the model accuracy on the original task is not
affected by the watermark triggers, and the prediction that each
model would give to a clean instance are equally reliable. Each
of the models classifies accordingly 100% of the watermark
triggers. It is crucial that, all the models participating in the
ensemble be of high quality. In this way, since we are using
majority voting, in clean instances, the majority will be on the
correct class most of the time. Experimenting, by trying to
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Fig. 2. The amount in % of watermark verified for each of the models in an
Ensemble consisting of 7 ML models.
verify the watermark of each of the seven models, we observe
that, on average the legitimate owner is able to verify at most
a portion of 25.5% of its watermark (see Figure 2), meaning
that he is not getting enough correct answers as to be able to
claim the ownership of the model behind the MLaaS set up
by the adversary.
For more complex tasks like ImageNet image recognition
task in which the images involve all color channels and the
output space is 100 times bigger than MNIST, the amount
of watermark verified by the legitimate owner of each of the
models is close to 1/7 or around 15% for an ensemble of same
size(7 models).
Moreover we reduced the number of participating ML
models in the ensemble and attempted to verify the presence
of the watermark again. For ensembles of size 3 the average
portion of the watermark verified is 34%. Again the watermark
verification is successfully evaded. In the same time, by having
to build a smaller ensemble the adversary has to incur a much
lower cost to mount the attack.
This method is very effective in evading backdoor-based
watermarks presented by Adi et al [21]. Relying on the
uncertainty in prediction that a neural network gives to unseen
instances that are far from the training data distribution, the
adversary is able to set up a service with stolen proprietary
models, whose owners, by interacting with the adversarys
service, can not decide with high confidence that their ML
model has been stolen and is now part of the adversarys
MLaaS service.
IV. DETECTOR ATTACK
In this section we present another attack whose goal,
beside evading the watermark verification, is also reducing the
adversary’s costs to mount the attack. The adversary will need
to steal only one high quality model, and evade the watermark
verification by building a detection-mechanism based on deep
neural networks. The construction of the detection mechanism
will incur minimal costs to the adversary because it will rely
on using the same ML model that he stole.
API Layer
Query Instance
Detector
Clean  
Instance? Stolen Model
Yes No Reject Query or
return random class 
Prediction(Q)
Fig. 3. Evading watermark verification via Detector-mechanism
A. Attack Overview
The adversary will steal only one model. To build his service
the adversary can train a binary-classifier based on deep neural
networks. This classifier, here named Detector, will be queried
first when a new query is done to the adversarys service. The
detector will try to predict whether the current instance is a
clean one, or a possible watermark trigger. Depending on the
detectors answer, the query will either be forwarded to the
actual stolen model or be rejected by the service. The case
of rejection can be a feature that could lead to suspicions in
the side of the entity that is trying to verify the watermark.
So in cases when the detector decides that the current query
instance is a possible watermark-trigger, the service can return
a random class out of the stolen models output space. For each
watermark key, the legitimate owner has a success probability
of 1/l, where l denotes the number of labels in the output
space. A schematic representation of the adversarys service is
shown in Figure 3.
B. Detector Build-up
We consider an image classification task while building the
detector. The detector is built using the weights transferred
from the stolen model. So basically we are re-purposing the
stolen model into building a binary classifier. Initially we build
the training set for our detector. The dataset is equally balanced
between a variety of clean images, taken from the dataset made
available by Tokuda et al [25], and a set of abstract images,
partially generated using Python and partially gathered from
online repositories. Some images that are part of the dataset
are shown in Figure 4. Here we make the assumption that
the adversary has a small dataset consisting of clean instances
that are very close to the instances the stolen model is trained
on. This will make possible to train the detector to distinguish
between the legitimate queries and suspicious ones.
Fig. 4. Samples from the training set, clean image(left) taken from the dataset
of Tokuda et al [25], abstract image(right) taken from the paper presented by
Adi et al [21]
Our detector mechanism follows the line of work done in the
domain of distinguishing computer generated images, like the
image (right) in Figure 4, and clean images taken from digital
cameras. In this case works of [25], [26] were very helpful in
getting the necessary information that lead in the construction
of the detector mechanism. Having built the dataset with
images, we now proceed with the knowledge transfer process.
The transfer of knowledge from the stolen model is done
by passing each image of the dataset in the layers of the
stolen model and the obtained feature vectors will afterwards
be used to train a single-layer(or multi-layer) fully-connected
softmax classifier. These vectors will contain the important
features extracted by the (stolen)pre-trained network. These
features will be helpful to distinguish between the feature
vectors that the stolen classifier outputs for legitimate instances
related to the intended task and for instances that could be
possible watermark triggers. In this way the model we have
to construct will be easier to train. Before inputting the image
in the neural network for the purpose of feature-extraction,
we subtract to each of the pixels of the image the mean
pixel value of the ImageNet [27] dataset. This preprocessing
step is suggested in [1], for normalizing the picture, by the
mean value of a huge and high quality dataset. In this way
the features extracted by the network would be easier to
recognize, and subsequently the binary-classifier will be easier
to train, because the normalization of the picture serves to
highlight core features of the image that characterize it. The
feature extraction process is done by removing the output
layer of the pretrained-networks. The actual filter values of
the convolutional layers are the ones that actually extract the
features of the image.
C. Experiments
With the dataset obtained, a neural network with three
layers composed of 512, 256 and 2 fully-connected neurons
respectively is trained. The detector is trained on 50 epochs
with batch size of varying from 32, 64 and 128. Having a small
training set and also being a small neural network, the training
process is completed in a short amount of time. Specifically,
every epoch requires less than 2 seconds on a commodity
laptop. This demonstrates the cost reduction for the adversary
in his quest to evade the watermark verification. The obtained
classifiers achieves an accuracy above 90% on our test set
meaning that the legitimate owner, if he was querying with the
watermark trigger images, less than 10% of them would bypass
the detector. Verifying that small portion of the watermark
would not trigger any alarms on the legitimate owners side.
Moreover, we make things a bit more realistic by adding
in the training set even other types of images that can
be used as watermark triggers. For example the watermark
images can also be non-abstract ones, but computer tweaked
versions of real images. In this way we attempt to also detect
backdoors implemented following the work presented by Gu
et al [20]. To classify an image, the same procedure followed
for construction of the the dataset is performed. The image
is initially preprocessed, then is passed through the layers of
the pretrained-model to extract its feature-vector, and then is
queried to the detector for classification.
For experimenting the detector-based approach we chose
as the stolen model one of the neural networks trained on
ImageNet dataset like ResNet [5], InceptionV3 [28], Xcep-
tion [29], VGG16 and VGG19 [3]. The accuracy of the
detectors build upon them is displayed in Table I.
Feature Extractor Detector Accuracy (%)
ResNet50 95.81
InceptionV3 92.97
Xception 93.1
VGG16 93
VGG19 93.3
TABLE I
ACCURACY OF DETECTOR (3-LAYER FULLY CONNECTED ARCHITECTURE)
As we see from Table I, all the detectors built from the
models we are considering as stolen have a very good accuracy
in the distinguishing among clean and possible watermark
instances. All of them have a performance of well above 90%
which is more than enough to evade the watermark verification
from the legitimate owner of the ML model.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that current watermarking tech-
niques for deep neural networks are susceptible to evasion
attacks. We crafted two novel evasion attacks toward the
current watermarking techniques presented in [21].
One evasion attack is based on building an Ensemble of
deep neural networks stolen from different providers, but
trained to perform the same task. The adversarys service will
consist of a voting-mechanism built upon the ensemble of
stolen models. We show that by building such a service, the
adversary achieves both:
• Protection against watermark verification: Since the
watermark- trigger instances are very different compared
to the clean ones, and the watermark triggers are unique
to each of the models participating in the ensemble,
the predictions that the rest of the ensemble will give
to a watermark instance specific to one of the models,
most of the time will be different than the watermark-
trigger specified class. In this way the majority can not
be reached and the returned answer to the entity that is
attempting watermark verification will not be what he is
expecting. Experimentally, this method makes allows the
legitimate owner to verify only a small portion(around
30%) of the total watermark for models with output space
of cardinality 10, meaning that the legitimate owner of
the machine learning model is far from being sure that
that the model behind adversarys service, is his.
• Quality of Service: By forming an Ensemble of high
quality ML models, the prediction given to clean in-
stances will be even better than having only one predictor.
Research has shown that ensembles of good models are
actually better predictors [24].
The second attack is based on stealing only one ML model,
and building a binary-classifier that will serve as a Detector of
clean and possible watermark instances. With this attack the
adversary also achieves and maintains:
• Protection against watermark verification: The detec-
tor mechanism will correctly detect most of the possible
watermark instances, and the service will return a random
class prediction among the output space. This means that
the legitimate owner has a probability of 1/l to verify
each of his watermark-triggers for an output space of
cardinality l.
• Quality of Service: The stolen ML model is of high
quality. This means that the adversarys quality of service
will be high also.
VI. FUTURE WORK
As future work we intend on improving the detector mech-
anism, possibly using Generative Adversarial Networks [30].
Moreover, we would like to delve into the problem of detecting
and removing the backdoors in a neural network. Our prelim-
inary work shows that backdoored instances exhibit different
activation patterns when passing through the layers of the
neural network. We believe that a classifier can be trained
to detect in real time if a instance that is being queried to the
neural network is a possible backdoor or a legitimate instance.
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